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BOOK REVIEW
The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court: By Bob
Woodward and Scott Armstrong. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1979. Pp. 444.
It is said that "[il]ike frankfurters, laws cease to inspire respect
in proportion as we know how they are made."' What that state-
ment ignores is that some factors inherent in judicial lawmaking are
not readily discernible,' and especially so absent legal training. In a
recent book gaining nationwide attention, Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong attempt to show how law is made by the United States
Supreme Court. The book is not written by lawyers3 or for lawyers;
most of the information came to these reporters from former law
clerks of past and present Justices.' By recounting isolated details of
the resolution of a number of cases 5 from the 1969 Term through the
1975 Term, the writers purport to expose the "decision-making" of
an institution which has managed to "escape public scrutiny."" Thus,
packaged as a sort of political consumer's fact-finding expedition, the
text begins with a quote from Chief Justice Burger that the high
Court, because its decisions are "unreviewable," needs "careful
scrutiny."7 Unfortunately, what the authors have given the Court is
not that, and what they have written is likely to create public
disrespect for the legal system.
1. E. ESAR, COMIC DICTIONARY 158 (1943). Indiana legislators are fond of quip-
ping, "The making of law, like the making of sausage, should not be witnessed." Of
course, having seen sausage made, we may choose never to eat it again; we have no
choice but to be consumers of law.
2. See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
3. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 3 (1979). Nowhere is this more apparent than at page 184, where, after stating
that earlier cases, presumably including Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
were based on the ninth amendment, the authors paraphrase the tenth amendment.
One Justice's "very expansive view" of "due process" is explained in twenty-one words
at page 403.
4. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 3. One hundred seventy
law clerks were interviewed. For purposes of this review, the information is treated as
fact.
5. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Keyes v.
School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon Papers case); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
6. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Id. at 5.
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Unlike the book, this review is written for lawyers; like the
book, it incorporates a law clerk's perspective. It concentrates on
two questions: What does the book reveal? and does the revelation
matter?
Some words of caution, though, before we begin. Virtually
nothing in this book would be admissible in a court of law. It is
mainly double, triple, even quadruple hearsay. Even more disconcer-
ting is the authors' imputation of thoughts to characters whenever
the authors deemed it appropriate;' naturally, they did not deem it
appropriate to tell exactly where this occurs. The reader is left to
his own imagination to determine what is merely hearsay and what
is complete fiction, although the attribution is sometimes so
outrageous it is not difficult to distinguish.' Furthermore, the book
gives extensive treatment to relatively few decisions. Many deci-
sions are treated in less than a page, the book consistently failing to
disclose the Court's voluminous research.
Overall, "aftermath" is a fitting description of the book's ap-
proach. When addressing school busing questions, the authors direct
the reader to a unique side of lawmaking, the aftermath of judicial
legislation; 0 similarly, obscenity questions reflect the aftermath of
decreeing de novo review." Moreover, there are constant references
to the Warren Court- specifically, a continual attempt to compare
Chief Justice Burger unfavorably with former Chief Justice
Warren.2 Regardless of whether such unfavorable comparison is
justified, it is surely overdone. Burger is portrayed as a pompous,"uncontrollable, blustery braggart"" with no redeeming intellect, 4
8. "We have attributed thoughts, feelings, conclusions, predispositions and
motivations to each of the Justices." Id. at 4.
9. Consider, for example, this excerpt:
[Burger] had to attend a judicial conference in Williamsburg, Virginia. He
complained there about some of the attorneys who appeared before the
Supreme Court. "The quality is far below what it could be," he told a
discussion panel. [Federal Judge David] Bazelon too was on the panel, and
he praised the Chief Justice for speaking up about attorney incompetence.
Bazelon agreed that it was "the most serious threat to the administration
of justice." Privately, Bazelon thought the most serious threat to justice
was probably Burger.
Id. at 379.
10. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (manner in which school
desegregation to be achieved).
11. Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
12. See, e.g., B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 57, 64, 126, 197.
13. Id. at 173. The description is attributed to Justice Blackmun.
14. Justices Stewart, White, and Brennan reportedly debated whether Burger
was "evil or stupid." Id. at 323. Drafts written by the Chief Justice were frequently in-
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despised by nearly every member of the Court. 5 His overconcern
for ceremony is ridiculed."6 Likewise, his concern for power is exposed
by showing he sometimes withheld or changed his votes, apparently
to be in the majority and therefore able to assign the cases." This
kindles a recurring theme that this Chief Justice does not "lead" the
Court. Just how he might do so, or whether we might want him to
do so, is not clear; for those who question some of Burger's opinions,
the idea that he does not "lead" the Court may be quite satisfying.
Justice Stewart reportedly explained to Justice Powell that the
"leadership" of the Court consists of the middle votes,' 8 and realisti-
cally, this is true since a Chief Justice leads only if others choose to
follow. 9
The other Justices receive better reviews, but their portraits
are surprisingly one-dimensional. Blackmun is weak; 0 Marshall is
lazy;"1 Douglas is inflexible.22 Rehnquist is two-dimensioned -casual
and sneaky.23 Stewart, Powell, White, and Brennan are stronger
characters, but no one-with the possible exception of Stevens"-
ferior: Powell said if an associate in his firm had written the like, the associate would
have been fired, id. at 284; Stewart said one of Burger's drafts deserved a grade of
"D", id. at 347. Brennan referred to the Chief Justice as "Dummy." Id. at 359.
Burger's own clerk apologized for the quality of his employer's work. Id. at 250.
15. Id. at passim.
16. See, e.g., id. at 32n., 89, 153, 178, 269-70.
17. Frequently he would assign the cases to himself. This was his prerogative,
but he sometimes abused it by assigning to himself although his thinking on the case
was not in the mainstream of the majority. E.g., id. at 421 (the Nebraska Press case).
Assignment power could also be used to withhold public stature from a Justice by
delegating to him only insignificant decisions. Burger did this to Rehnquist, id. at 412,
and to Brennan. Id. at 419. Apparently the practice did not begin with Burger, for
Stewart complained of having received similar treatment from Warren. Id. at 105.
18. Id. at 256. This presages the conclusion. See id. at 444.
19. Warren Burger became the fifteenth Chief Justice of the Court, following
several whose names are all but forgotten in history. For more detailed information in
an effort at comparison, see L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS (1969). Additional
insights are provided in B. SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA (1974).
20. See, e.g., B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 106, 121, 176
("paralyzed by indecisiveness").
21. See, e.g., id. at 197, 258, 270, 429. Clerks in other offices regarded Mar-
shall as unfit to sit on the Court. Id. at 197.
22. See, e.g., id at 138n., 187, 189, 207, 278. Those who have heard accounts of
Douglas' return to the Court after retirement may be interested to read that he based
his action on a Supreme Court rule. See id at 397-98.
23. See, e.g., id. at 269, 383, 408. See also note 42 infra and accompanying
text.
24. This may be accounted for by the fact that Stevens was appointed in 1975,
close to the end of the period covered by the book.
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escapes unscathed. With selected anecdotes, the authors endeavor to
unmask the naivete," bigotry,' impressionability,' and interpersonal
animosity" of the Court. The raconteurs succeed in proving that
Supreme Court appointment does not divest an individual of his
humanity.'
The everyday interaction of these human-flawed jurists is
touted as the decision-making process. Compromises are given a
great deal of attention, apparently as if the Court should be able to
"find the law" without internal disagreement. Predictably, the com-
promises are most evident in the school busing cases, and with good
reason: the Court considered it necessary to hand down unanimous
busing decisions in order to avoid the appearance of disagreement
on the issue of desegration itself.30 In one such case,31 Justice Black
25. In one hilarious episode during a period of several obscenity decisions, the
Justices were shown a National Lampoon cartoon in which each was caricatured in
some deviate sexual act. Two of them, Blackmun and Brennan, did not understand
their roles. Brennan boasted to his clerks that he was the only one depicted favorably,
as he was spreading open his robe to protect children in front of him from witnessing
the others' acts. The clerks had to explain "flashing." Id. at 279-80.
26. For Burger's views on blacks, women, and Jews see id. at 283-84. Marshall
considered Burger a racist, id. at 178, but Marshall seemed to find racist implications
in various types of cases. He viewed capital punishment as the ultimate form of racial
discrimination, id. at 205, and sought flexibility in the abortion decision to give black
women more time to have pregnancy diagnosed. Id. at 232. Powell overcame his prior
prejudices against domestic radicals. Id. at 223.
27. See, e.g., id. at 185, 284. The appellant's brief in O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975), was written by a former Stewart clerk and aimed specifically at
garnering Stewart's vote. Id. at 371. Stewart was ultimately the writer of the opinion.
28. Id. at passim.
29. Cf. Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty. for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199,
1205 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting). "(W)hat we know as men is not forgotten
as judges." Id See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
Justice Cardozo said:
Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and dislikes, the
predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions
and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant
or judge. . . . There has been a certain lack of candor . . . as if judges
must lose respect and confidence by the reminder that they are subject to
human limitations .... The great tides and currents which engulf the rest
of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by. We like
to figure to ourselves the processes of justice as coldly objective and im-
personal. . . . That is an ideal of objective truth toward which every
system of jurisprudence tends. It is an ideal of which great publicists and
judges have spoken as of something possible to attain. [Quotations omitted.]
It has a lofty sound . . . but it can never be more than partly true.
Id. at 167-69.
30. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 97.
31. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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manipulated the Court into altering its views, by threatening to dis-
sent.2 A similar threat from White in the Nixon caseM resulted in an
objected-to draft's finally being amended.' Douglas, in like manner,
threatened a dissent exposing disagreement on a procedural matter
concerning the abortion cases.85 Douglas eventually relented." Nearly
every case seems to have elements of compromise, but such com-
promises do not discredit the process. The process is ever one of
balancing, and the value of unanimity, and certainly of majority, is a
factor to be balanced. If group compromise through individual
pressure is inevitable, it is far better that it come from within the
Court, rather than from another branch of government.
In a court composed of nine jurists, group compromise would
seem to be a sine qua non in a democracy.s Obviously, were each
32. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 95-112. A federal judge
observed that the decision looked like two opinions laid side-by-side. Id. at 112.
33. Id. at 332. White disagreed with the Chief Justice on the application of
Rule 17(C), and said he would write a separate dissent if the Chief Justice's draft
became law.
34. Burger amended his draft, actually substituting segments written by
other members of the Court; White's 17(C) opinion was incorporated almost verbatim.
Id. at 334.
35. After a visit from Burger, Blackmun "withdrew" his circulated abortion
case draft, saying it needed more work. That would put it over to the next term. View-
ing this as a political tactic in an election year, Douglas determined to publish an im-
mediate individual opinion lambasting this strategy. Id. at 187-88.
36. Douglas did not publish his dissent, believing it would prejudice the
resolution of upcoming abortion decisions. Id. at 189.
37. Of course, the most infamous blackmail of the Supreme Court was Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt's "Court-packing plan" of 1937. This resulted in the upholding
of the National Labor Relations Act as constitutional in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For more details, see Stern, The Commerce Clause and
the National Economy, 1933-46, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 677 (1946). For an account sug-
gesting the Act would have been upheld notwithstanding the President's threat, see B.
SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 159-60 (1974).
38. In an address to the Section of Judicial Administration of the American
Bar Association, Justice Douglas explained:
Certainty and unanimity in the law are possible both under the
fascist and communist systems. They are not only possible; they are in-
dispensable; for complete subservience to the political regime is a sine
qua non to judicial survival under either system. One cannot imagine the
courts of Hitler engaged in a public debate over the principles of Der
Feuhrer, with a minority of one or four deploring or denouncing the prin-
ciples themselves. One cannot imagine a judge of a Communist court
dissenting against the decrees of the Kremlin.
Disagreement among judges is as true to the character of
democracy as freedom of speech itself. The dissenting opinion is as gen-
uinely American as Otis' denunciation of the general warrants, as Thomas
1980]
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judge to write his own thoughts there would be nine opinions. Due
process requires a certain expediency, and it is doubtful that any
judge has ever agreed totally with the opinions in which he simply
"joins." Rather, he balances the magnitude of his objection against a
swift decision, as well as against the possibility of alienating his col-
leagues, and the future ramifications that would entail. Compromise
is an inherent part of agreement.
Apart from compromise, the book also evidences retrogression.
The changed Court membership brought with it a backward-looking
shift in philosophy and consequently the problem of dealing with
former decisions now considered incorrect3 by the later majority.
The subject surfaces throughout the book, both Black 0 and Harlan"
having voiced their sentiments. One way to resolve the problem
jurisprudentially is to distinguish earlier cases on their facts.42
Taken to its extreme, this avenue would provide no legal system at
all: nearly every case reaching an appellate court has distinguish-
Paine's, Thomas Jefferson's, or James Madison's briefs for civil liberties.
Democracy, like religion, is full of sects and schisms. Every political
campaign demonstrates it. Every session of a legislature proves it. No
man or group of men has a monopoly on truth, wisdom or virtue. An idea,
once advanced for public acceptance, divides like an ameoba. The if's and
but's and however's each claim a part; and what was once a whole is soon
carved into many separate pieces, some of which are larger than the
original itself.
Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 104 (1948).
39. "Incorrect" may be an inadequate description; apart from evaluating the
law, the jurists also are able to take into account the changes their decisions have
wrought on the system and on society as a whole. In reconsidering the effect of
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), the court heeded financial problems of urban
areas. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 406-08.
40. Although he disagreed with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Black did
not want to overrule it; he preferred to create a checklist of "reasonable" and"unreasonable" searches. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 116.
41. Harlan advocated cutting back on the rule announced in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), but he did not want to begin overruling cases simply
because the Court's majority had changed its membership. B. WOODWARD & S. ARM-
STRONG, supra note 3, at 113.
42. Rehnquist was a master at this. See id. at 403-05 for his undulating
separation of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) from the earlier Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
Justice Cardozo pointed out that our system stands indicted for "uncertainty"
when, among other things, attempted distinctions are made on facts which present no
distinction in applicable legal principles. See B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 3
(1924). "Judgments themselves have importance . . . as they permit a reasonable
prediction that like judgments will be rendered if like situations are repeated. ...
When the uniformities are sufficiently constant to be the subject of prediction with
reasonable certainty, we say that law exists." Id. at 37-38.
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able facts. Each new majority is thus faced with an institutional
policy decision having far-reaching significance for the entire
system."
When Stevens replaced Douglas, the newest majority emerged
full-strength. National League of Cities v. Usery" highlights the swing-
ing of the judicial pendulum. The deciding of Usery, overruling
Maryland v. Wirtz" and making a marked incursion into Congres-
sional exercise of Commerce Clause power, provides insight into the
reluctance of some to shift from a prior stance. In a remarkable con-
frontation, Justice White convinced Justice Stewart to join the opin-
ion, despite Stewart's disinclination. ' The import of this conversa-
tion will be lost on the reader untrained in law. To those who
understand the legal process, however, it clearly signifies the
weighing of stare decisis against the perceived need for change. 7 In
a real sense, it shows the system works as it should, regardless of
one's opinion of the result.
Admittedly, that conclusion requires reading between lines; the
text seems calculated to inspire cynicism. For example, circulated
drafts of proposed opinions are criticized by Justices and clerks as
inept, unprofessional attempts, sometimes embodying misleading
citations or hidden traps.48 In a few instances, Justices indicated
they did not even realize what they had written. 9 Burger's approach
43. A sterling example is the death of the Lochner v. New York, 189 U.S. 45
(1905), line of cases, overruled in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
44. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
45. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (sustained application of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to include hospitals, nursing homes, and educational institutions, whether public or
private).
46. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 407. White reasoned that
the unflinching position kept the "jurisprudence of the Court tied up for reasons that
are not on the public record." Id.
47. For an excellent discussion of the principle of stare decisis and a discourse
of how it is frequently misunderstood, see Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis, 33 COLUM.
L. REV. 199 (1933).
48. See, e.g., B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 383, 408. From
a law clerk's perspective, it should be pointed out that the misuse of citations is not
per se a deliberate, insidious fraud one judge attempts to perpetrate on the others.
The misuse of citation is frequently the mark of negligence, as the writer of the opin-
ion has unwittingly relied upon the brief of (usually) the appellant to present accurate
representations of case law. Ethical Consideration 7-23 and Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(5) are apparently not sufficient to prevent this.
49. E.g., id. at 153-54 (Burger on Charlotte-Mecklenburg); id. at 198 (Marshall
on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)). This may indicate the extent to which the
Justices rely on their clerks. With respect to Marshall, at least, this is revealed in the
text. See id. at 258.
1980]
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to the Nixon tapes case' is far from laudable, as is Blackmun's hand-
ling of Roe v. Wade." Brennan's treatment of Moore v. Illinois,2
though he did not write it, can only be described as unconscionable.'
The book's tendency to discourage confidence in the system cannot
be denied.
There is nevertheless a positive view. First, while the drafts
were decried as horrible, they did not become law until they were
altered; or, if they did become law, dissents were filed. Second, we
should note the substantive reasons some drafts were objectionable.
In one case, 5' other Justices had to remind the novice Blackmun that
a Supreme Court decision stands as precedent for all similar cases
rather than representing a simple resolution for two parties. 5
Deciding issues not presented, on the other hand, would draw
Harlan's opposition.5 6 Stewart's objection to obscenity decisions was
his conviction that "local standards" were inconsistent with a
singular first amendment.57 Brennan feared Powelrs vague pro-
posals on the Nixon case would undo much of Marbury v. Madison;'
yet Stewart thought Burger's approach to the same case was
judicial legislation." Moreover, the overriding strictures of the bus-
ing and obscenity cases were that the proposed opinions did not
make the law exactly clear to lower courts.'0 It was not that the
Court did not understand; it was that the Court had to teach. The
fact that such criticisms were made is again a positive reflection;
50. Id. at 287-334. See note 34 supra.
51. It should come as no surprise, to those familiar with the opinion, that it
was apparently written in the library of the Mayo Clinic. See id. at 229-30. Justice
White reportedly described Blackmun as having appointed himself "an unofficial
medical board." Id. at 416. Blackmun's overriding concern for physicians' discretion and
medical evidence was creating a class of cases'akin to "political questions" in which the
Court should not interfere. Id. White recognized that the opinion had subjected the
Court to riducule. Id.
52. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
53. Despite his belief that the decision was wrong, Brennan joined Blackmun's
opinion in an effort to bolster that Justice's independence from Burger. B. WOODWARD
& S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 225. His clerks were shocked. Id.
54. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
55. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 121.
56. Id. at 206.
57. Id. at 249.
58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra
note 3. at 298-99.
59. Id. at 338.
60. See, e.g., id. at 47, 281. The words "all deliberate speed" from Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), had resulted only in delay.
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and viewed in this light, the first drafts matter little. What matters
is the judicial process itself-an idea sadly missing in this book.
Indeed, the book's entire premise-that we need this informa-
tion to evaluate the quality of the Court's decision-making8'-is
misconceived. The judicial branch is not a compeer of the other
branches of government, and its performance cannot be identically
evaluated. Woodward and Armstrong, like skeptical legal
positivists, 2 ask us to disregard the difference. The distinction,
however, is critical: courts must give reasoned opinions for their
decisions." The three functions of the judicial system-law declara-
tion, fact identification, and law application-are all exhibited in the
written decision, and can be evaluated there." The genesis of the
decision as focalized by these authors has no meaning for the
system. A lawyer cannot appear before a court and cite The
Brethren as authority. All that has meaning in our system is the
decision itself. Language is the exponent of intention; 5 the Court is
to be taken at its word. What the Court writes, it must honor, as
must those who receive its directives.
61. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 1-4.
62. See generally L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 112 (1968).
63. See generally Llewellyn, Impressions of the Conference, 14 U. CIN. L.
REV. 343 (1940).
64. With one caveat: the Court must identify the facts accurately, in order for
the application of the law to be a logical synthesis. The book suggests this was not
always done. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 118, 225. In each
case, a different, more correct view of the facts was noted but not disclosed to the rest
of the Court. In both cases, it was Justice Brennan who declined to disclose the infor-
mation. Justice Rehnquist in one opinion misstated the legislative history of a law. Id.
at 222. There is perhaps little protection against this abuse beyond a petition for
rehearing (for the prejudiced party) or a comparison with lower court decisions and
public legislative records (for attorneys).
It should be noted, however, as in note 48 supra, that such a misrepresentation
could be made by one or both parties on appeal (or on writ of certiorari). The Supreme
Court of Indiana recently reprimanded an appellant for doing so. See Ashbaugh v.
State, __ Ind. -, 400 N.E. 2d 767, 772 (1980). Except in the unusual circumstances
of de novo review, a court at the appellate level is not required to read a transcript to
ascertain the facts. The Supreme Court is not, after all, a trial court. In both instances
referred to above, it was by reading the transcripts and re-weighing the evidence that
the distortions were discovered by clerks. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra
note 3, at 118, 224. For a discussion of the Court's power to review the facts and its
self-restraint in that regard, see Note, Supreme Court Review of State Court Findings
of Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 STAN. L. REV. 328 (1962).
65. This maxim, Index amini sermo, is generally applied to written in-
struments such as contracts and wills; however, it has also been cited with reference
to the interpretation of statutes, and the point is the same regarding interpretation of
a written decision.
1980]
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Accordingly, nothing divulged alters the way law is to be prac-
ticed, nor should it change the way an attorney reacts intellectually
to Supreme Court decisions. There have been badly written, badly
reasoned opinions; that was already clear. There have been un-
published disagreements; that is to be expected. There has been
retrogression; that is part of the system. Yet the simplistic treat-
ment of the subject matter leaves the public unaware that a great
heritage of centuries of judge-made law stands behind every deci-
sion, that the decisions signify more than outcomes of personal
squabbles. The revelations of The Brethren may unavoidably dis-
quiet the public, but they need not discomfort its legal community.
If anything should disturb the legal profession, it is the fact of
revelation itself. Various accounts demonstrate that confidentiality
was part of the law clerks' employment obligation,"0 yet the book
bespeaks an arrant violation of that trust. In analyzing the ethics of
such disclosure, we should not be misled, either by a notion that
these persons were exempt from the standard to which other
lawyers are held, or that their disclosures are somehow justified as
fostering better government. Neither apologetic makes sense.
Whether they are regarded as lawyers under the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility or as court personnel under the Code of
Judicial Conduct, the standard has been abrogated.
Judicial clerks are not addressed directly by either Code, but
the American Bar Association states, "(T)he Disciplinary Rules
should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature
of their professional activities." 7 This statement is broad enough to
encompass law clerks, and such persons have been recognized in
ABA Informal Opinions." One of these edicts appears to perceive
the special relationship existing between a law clerk and his
employer. 9 Unlike other lawyers,"0 the law clerk holds ex parte con-
66. Id at 150, 237, 288, 298, 356. For a somewhat unusual treatment of this
problem, see Abramson, Should a Clerk Ever Reveal Confidential Information?, 63
JUDICATURE 361 (1980).
67. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1978).
68. E.g., ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL
OPINION, No. 1346 (1975); ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, IN-
FORMAL OPINION, No. 1333 (1975). The latter recognizes that a law clerk might be a per-
son not admitted to the Bar.
69. Informal Opinion 1346, supra note 68, deals with the question of a judge's
"farming-out" research questions to a center for legal research. This was deemed im-
proper, absent notice to all parties; notice was not required for his talks with court
personnel.
70. Other lawyers would be barred by Disciplinary Rule 7-110(B).
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versations with the judge. To some degree, he becomes the alter ego
of the judge.7 Thus, the judge is not the clerk's client; rather, the
clerk is the judge's working, thinking tool. His technical status as a
lawyer"' is not so important as his status as an arm of the Court.
Canon Three of the Judicial Code directs a judge to require those
who serve him to observe "the standards of fidelity and diligence
which apply to him."73 Foremost among these is upholding the in-
tegrity and independence of the judiciary. 7' For this reason, confi-
dentiality is expected and essential.
This is not to suggest that the clerk is a mechanical employee
untouched by personal ethics. On more than one recounted occasion,
clerks in The Brethren refused to follow Justices' directions, believ-
ing them unethical.7 ' Despite the duty to reveal knowledge of
misconduct by a judge," apparently no clerk took this directive
seriously enough to expose the violation,7 7 if one existed. Similarly,
there is a duty to make certain that judges are fit for the offices
they hold,78 but there is a corresponding duty to "avoid petty
criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to
lessen public confidence in our legal system. "I Criticisms motivated
by any reason other than improvement of the system are not
justified." The concern for improvement of the system also permits
disclosure of factual material for publication if it would "supply a
tool by which the legal profession and others concerned ... may bet-
ter serve their clients."'" The revelations proffered for publication in
The Brethren fall far short of these ideals. Instead, they represent
myopic recitations of educated disagreement, under the guise of
educating the public about its highest institution's "decision-making."
71. Justice Powell specifically requested that his law clerks present the
liberal view to him as a challenge to his ordinarily conservative thinking. B. WOOD
WARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 354-55. An "alter ego" is also a confidante, a
trusted companion.
72. See note 68 supra. It is not clear whether the fact of nonadmittance to a
specific Bar would classify the clerk as other than an attorney.
73. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)2) (1978).
74. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1 (1978).
75. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 138, 278. See also id. at
222 (clerk apologizes).
76. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-103 (1978).
77. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, states that the Justices "shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour."
78. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 8, EC 8-6 (1978).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL DECI-
SION C-762 (1964) (giving information on jury verdicts).
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A jurist expects "public scrutiny";" absent professional miscon-
duct, he should not have to anticipate private betrayal in a best-
seller. If a conclusion springs from this book, it is that written deci-
sions, more than Justices, need scrutiny; that lawyers, not laymen,
should do the scrutinizing; and that irresponsible disclosures by law
clerks are as inimical to our system as are attorneys' breaches of
confidentiality.
Dierdre A. Burgman*
82. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2, Commentary (1978).
* Member, Indiana Bar. Law clerk to Hon. Paul H. Buchanan, Jr., Chief
Judge, Indiana Court of Appeals. The views expressed in this review are not
necessarily those of Chief Judge Buchanan or of any other Judge of the Indiana Court
of Appeals.
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